NOTES
It might be urged that a demand upon the body of shareholders is desirable
as a means of giving the shareholders notice of the suit and an opportunity to
join. Under such a view, however, it would be difficult to explain why demand
should ever be excused, as is frequently the case.39 While notice of the pendency
of such suits would seem desirable, other means are available, and the cost
should probably not be borne by the plaintiff.
It may be that the demand on the shareholders is insisted upon as a purely
formal requirement in the perfection of the plaintiff's derivative cause of action,
imposed by statute or precedent. Some state statutes specifically so provide4o
and Federal Rule 23 4 is perhaps susceptible of such an interpretation. But in
this rule the qualifying words "if necessary" may be interpreted to make the
demand unnecessary in cases where the shareholders have no power to "ratify."42 In the absence of persuasive reasons for a requirement of demand in
such cases, it is to be anticipated that in federal and state courts alike the rule
of the Belmont case will be followed with increasing frequency.

JUDICIAL REVIEW OF NEGATIVE ORDERS OF THE
FEDERAL COMMISSIONS
The Federal Power Act' and the Public Utility Holding Company Act of
require, in general, the approval of the proper commission3 before a
corporation subject to either act may sell or otherwise dispose of any part
19352

of its facilities valued in excess of $50,000, merge with any other unit, issue

any security, alter the rights of security holders, or service any affiliate or
subsidiary. If, after due hearing, one of the commissions unreasonably refuses
to approve some proposed action, the problem arises as to what relief the aggrieved party may obtain in the federal courts.
39 See

notes 4, 29, 3o, and 3i supra. What will constitute an excusing circumstance is within

the discretion of the court. An inference that the wrongdoers dominated the shareholders because the latter were blood relatives was refused to be drawn in Caldwell v. Eubanks, 326 Mo.
185, 30 S.W. (2d) 976 (I93O) and Hagood v. Smith, 162 Ala. 512, 50 So. 374 (1909). The practical difficulty of convening the stockholders was deemed sufficient to excuse a demand in
Shoening v. Schwenk, 112 Iowa 733, 84 N.W. 916 (igoi). The necessity of haste may often
excuse the demand. See Passmore v. Allentown &Reading Traction Co., 267 Pa. 356, 1io At.
240 (1920).
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40 See Ga. Civil Code tit. 22, c.71I, § 2224 (1933); Smith v. Coolidge Banking Co., I47 Ga. 7,
S.E. 519 (1917); Alexander v. Searcy, 8i Ga. 536, 8 S.E. 63o (i888).
41 Note

7 supra.

4See opinion

of Justice Stone in Rogers v. Guaranty Trust Co. of New York, 288 U.S.

123,

133 (1933).

x49 Stat. 847 (1935), 16 U.S.C.A. § 824 (Supp. 1938), amending Federal Water Power Act,
41 Stat. 1077 (1920), 16 U.S.C.A. 791 (1927).
2 49

Stat. 803 (1935) , z 5 U.S.C.A. 79 (Supp. 1938).

3The Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935 is administered by the Securities and Exchange Commission, and the Federal Power Act by the Federal Power Commission.
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An order of a commission refusing to take some requested action is commonly referred to as a "negative order." The review of such orders of the
Interstate Commerce Commission have been held beyond the jurisdiction of the
federal courts. 4 There has, however, been some confusion as to what constituted a negative order. In the first case ennunciating the Negative Order Doctrine, Proctor and Gamble Co. v. United States,5 the Supreme Court used the
expression to mean an order which does not require any judicial action for its
enforcement, or, in other words, does not raise a duty on the part of any person
to act in obedience to it.
The Supreme Court, however, in two later cases laid down another requirement; it must also be an order which does not alter the status quo. In United
States v. New River Co., 6 the Interstate Commerce Commission decided that
the prevailing rule as to distribution of coal cars among mines was unfair, and
by an informal announcement caused the carriers to apply a new rule. Later
the case was reopened, the commission changed its mind ahd dismissed the
complaints against the old rule, thereby, in effect, re-establishing it. The Supreme Court said the order dismissing the complaint was not negative because
it "permits and authorizes the carriers to apply rule four" (the old rule) and
that "the effect of the order is to grant the relief sought by the operators of
local mines." The same result was reached in Powell v. United States,7 where
the order in question was one striking from the commission's files a tariff of
rates then in effect as to a six mile piece of track. The court said that "overemphasis upon the mere form of the order may not be permitted to obscure its
purpose and effect. By it the commission meant to put an end to the tariff
in question ..... The order would eliminate that rule and substitute for it
terms of the tariffs applicable prior to its effective date." 8
The problem of the extent and effect of the Negative Order Doctrine has be4 Proctor and Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U.S. 282 (1912); Manufacturers Railway
Co. v. United States, 246 U.S. 457 (i9i8); Lehigh Valley Ry. Co. v. United States, 243 U.S.
412 (1917); Piedmont and Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 280 U.S. 469 (1930); Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 283 U.S. 235 (x93i); United States v. Corrick, 298 U.S. 435 (1936);
United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226 (1938); Shanahan v. United States, 303 U.S. 596 (I938).
For general discussion of the Negative Order Doctrine see note, 47 Yale L.J. 766 (1937); note,

34 Col. L. Rev. 9o8 (1934).
S 225 U.S. 282 (1912).
730o U.S. 276 (i937)-

6 265 U.S. 533 (1924).

See also American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 93 F. (2d) 236 (App. D.C. 1937).
8Poweil v. United States, 300 U.S. 276 (1937). The one irreconcilable Supreme Court case
is Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. United States, 234 U.S. 476 (1913), where the
railroad sued to enjoin an order of the Interstate Commerce Commission refusing to give the
petitioner authority to change the relative rates on long and short hauls. The Supreme Court
upheld the assumption of jurisdiction by the district court, and in rejecting the contention
that the order was negative, said that "the proposition disregards the fact that the right to petition the Commission conferred by the statute is positive and while refusal to grant it may be in
one sense negative, in another and broader view it is affirmative since it refuses that which the
statute in affirmative terms declares shall be granted if only the conditions which the statute
provides are found to exist," thus in terms limiting negative orders to "justifiable" orders.

NOTES
come increasingly important under the Federal Power Act 9 and Public Utility
Holding Company Act"° which provide that "Any party .... aggrieved by an order issued by the commission .... may obtain a review of such order in the circuit court of appeals of the United States .... by filing in such court .... a written petition praying that the order of the commission be modified or set aside in
whole or in part." The applicability of the Negative Order Doctrine to this clause
has been considered in three recent circuit court of appeals decisions.." In Houslot NaturalGas Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Commission' 2 the fourth circuit
dismissed for want of jurisdiction an appeal from a negative order of the
Securities and Exchange Commission. The appeal was brought under the authority of the above quoted clause of the Public Utility Holding Company Act.
The court cited as authority the Supreme Court decisions,"3 establishing the
Negative Order Doctrine, where orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission were considered. In these cases the pertinent statute' 4 gave the Commerce Court ' s jurisdiction of: "First. All cases for the enforcement, otherwise
than by adjudication and collection of a forfeiture or penalty or by infliction
of criminal punishment, of any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission
other than for the payment of money. Second. Cases brought to enjoin, set
aside, annul, or suspend in whole or in part any order of the Interstate Commerce Commission." The Supreme Court reasoned that the first section providing for the enforcement of orders could only mean affirmative orders, and
since the second section dealt with the "same subject from a reverse point of
view," the word "order" must have the same limited meaning in the second
Admitting that this case conflicts with the definition of a negative order as a not-needing-enforcement and not-altering-status quo one, the definition still embraces nine subsequent Supreme Court cases which can only be regarded as in effect overruling this case.
949 Stat. 86o (1930), 16 U.S.C.A. 8251 (Supp. 1938).
1049 Stat. 834 (1935), r5 U.S.C.A. 79x (Supp. 1938). The National Labor Relations Act,
49 Stat. 453 (1935), 29 U.S.C.A. i6o (f) (Supp. 1938) has a similar review provision. Under
that act, however, negative orders will be relatively rare.
x"Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, iooF.(2d) 5 (C.C.A.
4th 1938); Newport Electric Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 97 F.(2d) 58o (C.C.A.
2d 1938); Pacific Power and Light Co. v. Federal Power Commission, 98 F.(2d) 835 (C.C.A.
9 th 1938). The Newport case was not appealed, but application for a writ of certiorarihas been
made in the Pacific Power and Light case.
- ioo F. (2d) 5 (C.C.A. 4th 1938).
's Supra, note 4. It is interesting to note that in the Houston case judge Healy, one of the
commissioners of the Securities & Exchange Commission, filed a statement opposing the contention of the commission's counsel that the Negative Order Doctrinewas applicable to the case,
and requesting a decision upon the merits of the controversy.
'4 Commerce Court Act, 36 Stat. 539 (1910), 28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (27), (28) (1927). See note
i5 infra.
's This court, created in igio by the Commerce Court Act, was abolished in 1913 and its
jurisdiction transferred to the federal district courts by the Urgent Deficiencies Act, 38 Stat.
219 (1913). See note 14 supra.
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section. 6 A similar argument was made as to the section providing that the
pendency of a suit to enjoin or set aside an order of the Interstate Commerce
Commission should not suspend the operation of such an order.
The Supreme Court has suggested as another ground 7 for the Negative
Order Doctrine that negative orders are unimportant. Therefore, since the
Urgent Deficiencies Act 8 which gave the district courts jurisdiction to review
orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission, also provided for a three
judge court, priority over other cases, and direct appeal to the Supreme Court,
the court argued that this exceptional type of review should not be construed
to extend to such negative (and therefore unimportant) orders.
In the cases where the petitioner claimed to be outside the jurisdiction of the
Interstate Commerce Commission, 9 the Supreme Court further suggested that
the negative order had no res judicata effect as to the issue of the railroad's
immunity from the operation of the statute, and suggested that "what plaintiffs are seeking is, therefore, in substance, a declaratory judgment that the
Railway is within the exemption,"'2 and that the court had no jurisdiction to
give such a remedy. The Supreme Court has also thrown in the argument that
a review of negative orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission would
result in the usurpation by the courts of technical questions more properly
handled by the commission."1
Whatever the validity of these reasons where orders of the Interstate Commerce Commission were involved, it is apparent that they have but little
application to the cases arising under the Federal Power Act and the Public
Utility Holding Company Act. The word "order" in these acts does not have
any preceding section where the word is used in the affirmative sense as in the
Urgent Deficiencies Act which provided for a review of orders of the Interstate
Commerce Commission. The review by the circuit court of appeals provided
by the two recent acts is not an exceptional one .such as is provided under the
Urgent Deficiencies Act. Even if a review by the circuit court of appeals would
require in effect a declaratory judgment, such a result would not seem objectionable now that the Federal Declaratory Judgment Act- has been held constitutional.23 Finally, whether the order needs enforcement or alters the status
quo has little relevance to the problem of what highly technical problems
16See Procter and Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U.S.
'7 See United States v. Griffin, 3o3 U.S. 226 (1938).

282 (1912).

s38 Stat. 219 (1913), 28 U.S.C.A. § 47 (i927).
X See Piedmont and Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 280 U.S. 469 (1930); Lehigh Valley
Ry. Co. v. United States, 243 U.S. 412 (1917).
20 Piedmont and Northern Ry. Co. v. United States, 280 U.S. 469, 477 (1930).

= See Procter and Gamble Co. v. United States, 225 U.S. 282, 287 (1912); Manufacturers
Ry. Co. v. United States, 246 U.S. 457, 483 (1918).
" 48 Stat (1934), as amended by 49 Stat. 1014, 1027 (I935), 28 U.S.C.A. 400 (Supp. i938).
"- Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937), rehearing denied, 30o U.S. 687
(1937).

NOTES

should be left to the commission for determination, since negative and affirmative orders generally involve the same questions.
In Newport Electric Corp. v. FederalPower Conmnission,24 the second circuit
dismissed for want of jurisdiction an appeal under the Federal Power Act from
a negative order of the Federal Power Commission. In adopting the Negative
Order Doctrine, the court further suggested that "the reason lying behind the
distinction between affirmative and negative orders in cases reviewing orders
of the Interstate Commerce Commission is that a judgment to set aside a
negative order would be ineffective, and that therefore a more narrow interpretation of the jurisdictional statute was preferred. '25 Until the Federal Power
Commission or Securities and Exchange Commission issues an order of approval, a merger would be unlawful. Thus, the petitioner would receive no
practical relief unless the court issued a mandatory injunction commanding
the commission to approve the proposed merger, and this the court said was
beyond its power under the appeal provisions of the Federal Power Act. Since
the many opinions of the Supreme Court upon this problem fail to state this
argument of the ineffectiveness of the court's judgment, it is doubtful whether
it had any influence upon that court's decisions. Since the Urgent Deficiencies
Act, unlike the Federal Power Act, specifically gave the court jurisdiction to
"enjoin" the Interstate Commerce Commission,' 6 the Supreme Court in the
Interstate Commerce cases perhaps assumed that if jurisdiction was obtained,
a mandatory injunction could issue as easily as a judgment setting aside the
order.
Let us, however, evaluate the argument solely in terms of its validity as
regards the Newport case itself. Even assuming for the moment that no other
form of relief is within the power of the court to issue, it may still be argued that
a judgment setting aside the negative order would not be completely valueless.
After such a judgment, it is highly probable that the Federal Power Commission would hold another hearing,'7 at which time the petitioner despite previous
failures might be able to persuade the commission of the soundness of its views.
It is even possible that the commission, without any other proceedings, might
voluntarily accede to the court's views as shown by the judgment setting aside
the negative order, and enter an order of approval.
8
In Pacific Power and Light Co. v. Federal Power CommissionW
the ninth
circuit overruled a motion to dismiss for want of jurisdiction an appeal under
the Federal Power Act from a negative order of the Federal Power Commission. Rejecting the second circuit's position, the court suggested that the set6
F. (2d) 58o (C.C.A. 2d 1938).
2sId. at 582.
2 Supra, note i8.
27 In United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226 (1938) the district court set aside the negative
order of the Interstate Commerce Commission and directed it to take further action. The
commission thereupon held another hearing and again declined to permit an increase of the
rate in question. A second action in the district court, after appeal to the Supreme Court,
was dismissed for want of jurisdiction under the Negative Order Doctrine.
2898 F. (2d) 835 (C.C.A. 9th 1938).
24 97
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ting aside of the commission's order is analogous to a reversal of judgment and
remanding for a new trial, and that "it will not be presumed that the Board,
any more than a court, will repeat in its proceedings an error of law so determined by the judicial tribunal reviewing the order. ' 129 The analogy, though
interesting, seems of questionable strength, for a commission tends to have a
rather different attitude to~'ard an appellate court than does a lower court, and
violates no express order or direction of the court if it chooses to remain inactive after a decision setting aside its negative order. Moreover, a lower
court upon the remanding of a case with directions may be compelled by mandamus to comply with those directions,30 while, as shown hereafter, the commission quite possibly cannot be so compelled.
The ninth circuit, moreover, in assuming jurisdiction distinguishes the cases
brought under the Federal Power Act from those under the Urgent Deficiencies
Act on the ground that, by providing that "if the commission finds that the proposed disposition, consolidation, acquisition, or control will be consistent with
the public interest, it shall approve the same,"-3 the Federal Power Act conferred
upon the petitioner a "substantive right" in contradistinction to the more discretionary language of the Interstate Commerce Acts which provide, for example, that "whenever ....the commission shall be of opinion that any individual or joint rate, fare, or charge whatsoever ....is or will be unjust or
unreasonable ....the commission is authorized and empowered to determine
and prescribe what will be the just and reasonable individual or joint rate,
fare, or charge ....and to make an order that the carrier or carriers shall
cease and desist from such violation."32 By saying that the petitioner has a
"substantive right," the court evidently meant that he has a legally enforceable right, and thus assumed that the negative order in the case before it
was reviewable. By its emphasis upon the word "shall" in the Federal Power
Act section just quoted, however, the court implies that this result follows from the lesser degree of discretion conferred upon the Federal Power
Commission by this act. The validity of such an interpretation is, indeed,
questionable. The wording of the Federal Power Act to many might seem to
confer more rather than less discretion upon the Federal Power Commission
than the Interstate Commerce Acts do upon the Interstate Commerce Commission. Moreover, if either commission's negative orders are so discretionary
as to be not reviewable, the same should hold true of its affirmative orders,
but no one contends that they are not reviewable. The absence of discretionary language in the Supreme Court negative order decisions suggests that that
court has not been greatly influenced by this contention, nor, for the considerations just outlined, does it seem likely that it will be in the future.
Id. at 838.
30 It re Potts, i66 U.S. 263 (1897); Goldwyn Pictures Corp. v. Howells Sales Co., 287 Fed.
29

ioo (C.C.A. 2d 1923).
3 49 Stat. 849 (193s), x6 U.S.C.A. § 824 b (Supp. 1938).
3236
Stat. s55 (Iro), 49 U.S.C.A. § 15(l) (1927).
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Assuming that the court has jurisdiction to review the negative orders of
the Federal Power Commission or Securities and Exchange Commission, the
question arises as to what form of relief the circuit court of appeals can give
the petitioner. The Federal Power Act and Public Utility Holding Company
Act each provide that the circuit court of appeals "shall have exclusive
jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or set aside such order in whole or in part."33

Clearly the court can set aside the negative order. It is suggested, moreover,
that jurisdiction to "modify" an order gives the circuit court of appeals power
to decree that the order refusing to grant approval of the proposed action is
thereby modified so as to approve the proposed action. The dictionary definition, "to change somewhat the form or qualities of; to alter somewhat"' 4 suggests that changing an order of disapproval to one of approval is changing the
order so much as to not "modify" it, but substitute a new order of the court
in place of the old one. In one sense, however, any modification of an order of
a commission by the court will result in the substitution of a new order in that
it is a different order from the one preceding it. The issue, therefore, is not
whether the new order as decreed by the court has all of the characteristics of
the old but whether it has enough as to be considered only modified. The language refusing to approve the proposed action might be considered the essential part of the order, modification of which could be accomplished only by a
change of parties or extent of subject matter affected. On the other hand, it
is suggested that in view of the general language used, the fact that the new
order decreed by the court concerns the same parties and subject matter as
the old one make it merely a modification of the old negative order.
Such a decree modifying a negative order should not be confused with a
mandatoryinjunction to the commission. Thedecree modifying the commission's
order would make that order, as modified, immediately effective. On the other
hand, a mandatory injunction designed to modify an order of the commission
would require action by the commission before effectively causing the modification of that order. Since a decree affirming or setting aside an order in whole or
in part would immediately affect the commission's order, it would seem that
the word modify was, also, used in the more direct sense, i.e., that a decree
of the court would immediately and without any action by the commission
affect the order. Despite the greater attractiveness, however, of the arguments
for a modifying decree rather than a mandatory injunction, the two decisions35
33 Supra, note 3. Because of the word "modify," the provision may be unconstitutional as
requiring administrative action by a constitutional court. See Ex parte Bakelite Corp., 279
U.S. 438 (1929); note, 34 Col. L. Rev. 352 (1934). The Radio Act of 1927, 44 Stat. 1162 (z927),
47 U.S.C.A. § 81 (1927) gave the court of appeals of the District of Columbia jurisdiction to
"alter or revise the decision appealed from and enter such judgment as to it may seem just."
The Supreme Court in Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co., 281 U.S. 464 (x930),
held the proceedings under the act were administrative, and, therefore, not reviewable by it.
34 Webster's New International Dictionary 1389 (8th ed. 1933).
3s Newport Electric Corp. v. Federal Power Commission, 97 F. (2d) 58o (C.C.A. 2d 1938);
Houston Natural Gas Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, ioo F. (2d) 5 (C.C.A.
4 th 1938).
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under the Federal Power Act, which mention the possibility of a mandatory
injunction, completely ignore the possibility of this other type of decree.
It would seem that the petitioner stands a poor chance of getting relief outside the direct statutory review provided in the Federal Power Act and Public
Utility Holding Company Act. If he seeks a mandatory injunction in a federal
district court before attempting to gain a review in the circuit court of appeals,
his bill would probably be dismissed on the ground that he had not first exhausted his statutory legal remedies,3 6 even though the circuit courts of
appeals disagree as to their jurisdiction over such a review. If the circuit
court of appeals dismissed his petition for review of the negative order for
want of jurisdiction, or else ineffectively set aside the negative order, and he
then sued in a federal district court for a mandatory injunction, he might have
to overcome the objection that such an injunction is beyond the jurisdiction
of the court.

37

More important would be the objection that Congress by providing that
the circuit court of appeals should have "exclusive jurisdiction" to affirm,
modify, or set aside the commissions' orders38 meant not only that no other
action could be sustained while this one was pending, but, also, that no action
could be brought at any other time. In a number of cases under similar review
provisions, the federal courts in dicta have seemed to adopt the latter interpretation.39 Such a position seems well justified if the circuit court of appeals
had assumed jurisdiction in the first action and had simply rendered an ineffective decree, for a second action in a district court to secure a mandatory
injunction would seem an unnecessarily tedious and wasteful way to settle
the controversy. If the first action, however, was dismissed on the ground that
the circuit court of appeals had no jurisdiction to review negative orders
under the two acts, the statutory provision providing for "exclusive jurisdiction" of that court should not bar an action in the district court. Even so,
the existence of an exclusive review by the circuit court of appeals of affirmative orders might well lead the district court to conclude that negative orders,
not being reviewable under the provisions of the two acts, are also not review36Sykes v. Jenny Wren Co., 78 F. (2d) 729 (App. D.C. 1935); Elliott v. El Paso Electric
Co., 88 F. (2d) 5o5 (C.C.A. 5th 1937), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 710 (1938); Clark v. Lindermann and Hoverson Co., 88 F. (2d) 59 (C.C.A. 7 th 1937), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 707 (1938).
37 As the federal district courts have no jurisdiction to entertain an original action of mandamus, McIntire v. Woods, 7 Cranch (U.S.) 504 (813); Covington & Cincinnati Bridge Co. v.
Hager, 203 U.S. io9 (igo6), it has, occasionally, been held that a mandatory injunction to accomplish the same end was also not available. Fineran v. Bailey, 2 F. (2d) 363 (C.C.A. 5 th
1924); Stevenson v. Holstein-Friesian Ass'n of America, 3o F. (2d) 625 (C.C.A. 2d 1929)*
The weight of authority, however, seems to be the other way. Chicago v. Fox Film Corp.,
251 Fed. 883 (C.C.A. 7th 1918); Bulger v. Benson, 262 Fed. 929 (C.C.A. 9 th 1920). See note,
38 Col.L. Rev.903 (1938). In contrast to the district courts, the courts of the District of Columbia have the power to issue mandamus, Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. (U.S.) 522 (1838);
Freund, Administrative Powers over Persons and Property 246 (1st ed. 1928).
39 Supra, note 3.
39 American Sumatra Tobacco Corp. v. Securities and Exchange Commission, 93 F. (2d) 236,
239 (App. D.C. 1937); Sykes v. Jenny Wren Co., 78 F. (2d) 729, 732 (App. D.C. 1935).

NOTES
able in an independent action, for there is no apparent reason why the procedure should differ between the review of a negative and an affirmative order.
The Negative Order Doctrine seems essentially an arbitrary one, whose
application should be closely limited for that reason. Whether an order is
negative, i.e., is a not-needing-enforcement and not-altering-status quo order,
seems to have little bearing upon the question of what orders of commissions
theoretically should be reviewable by the courts. 4° Negative orders are almost
without exception handled like affirmative ones in the state courts41which confine their attention in the main to the more practical problems of whether an
order is final rather than interlocutory,42 purely discretionary or legislative.43
If the petitioner is unable to get relief in the federal courts from a negative
order, the Federal Power Commission and Securities and Exchange Commission have, in effect, an absolute power to cause great loss to a utility coming
under their jurisdiction through their refusal to approve necessary measures.
Such a power might conceivably produce an unofficial yet, in effect, absolute
power over rates through the threat of an unfair use of the admittedly absolute
power over other aspects of the business. Whether or not these two commissions and those which Congress will see fit to provide with similar review provisions, would always use their power impartially and intelligently, and whether
or not the public would gain by the commissions' exercise of that power, unhampered by judicial review, it is, indeed, debatable whether the courts should
by the use of a technical doctrine give them such great power without the express authority of Congress.
40 Until 1938, with the exception of the Interstate Commerce Commission, the federal
courts had never declined to issue a mandatory injunction against any federal administrative
body solely because the order in question was negative. See Wilson v. Bowers, i4 F. (2d) 976
(D.C.N.Y. 1924) and Casper v. Doran, 30 F. (2d) 4oo (D.C. Pa. 1929) (authorization of withdrawal of alcohol); Jacob Hoffman Brewing Co. v. McElligott, 259 Fed. 321 (D.C.N.Y. igig),
order modified, 259 Fed. 525 (C.C.A. 2d igg) (delivery of beer revenue stamps). Moreover,
the Radio Act of 1927,44 Stat. 1162 (1927), 47 U.S.C.A. § 81 (1927) expressly allows an appeal
from many types of negative orders.
41ItalianAmerica Shipping Corp. v. Nelson, 32.311.427,154 N.E. 198 (1926) (mandamuslies
to compel issuance of a license);Jackman v. Public Service Commission of Kansas, 121 Kan. 141,
245 Pac. 1047 (1926) (approval of plans for a dam compelled by mandamus); Perkins Mfg. Co.
v. Jordan, 200 Cal. 667, 254 Pac. 551 (1927) (issuance of certificate to foreign corporation compelled); State ex rd. Blank v. Gramling, 219 Wis. 196, 262 N.W. 614 (1935) (mandamus lies to
compel issuance of doctor's license). However, in Seaberg v. Raton Public Service Co., i6
N.M. 59, 8 P. (2d) 100 (1932), the court dismissed a removal proceedings on the ground that
under the statute it could only enforce or refuse to enforce the commission's order, and, since
neither action would have any effect, it therefore did not have jurisdiction to review a negative
order.
42 See Capital Water Co. v. Public Utilities Commission, 41 Idaho i9, 237 Pac. 423 (1925);
Philadelphia City Passenger Ry. Co. v. Public Service Comm'n of Pennsylvania, 211 Pa. 31,
114 At. 642 (1921); State Public Utilities Comm'n v. Chicago Telephone Co., 287 Ill. 447,
122 N.E. 850 (1919).
43 See Comley v. Boyle, ix 5 Conn. 406, 162 At. 26 (1932); Bernstein v. City of Marshalltown, 215 Iowa ii68, 248 N.W. 26 (1933); Royal Glen Land and Lumber Co. v. Public Service
Comm'n, 91 W.Va. 446, 113 S.E. 749 (1922); Fishback v. Public Service Comm'n of Indiana,
193 Ind. 282, 138 N.E. 346 (1923).

